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RECRIMINATION V. COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE IN
DIVORCE SUITS
"Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of any cause of
divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of plaintiff's cause of divorce."1
That is to say, if both parties have grounds for a divorce, neither can
obtain one.
In Kim v. Kirn 138 Va. 132, 120 S.E. 850 (1924) the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia recognized recrimination as a
defense and stated that it would bar a divorce a vinculo or a mensa
et thoro. This rule has been softened by statute2 to the extent that
a divorce from bed and board shall not be a bar to either party's
obtaining a divorce from the bonds of matrimony if no cause for
absolute divorce was existing and known to the party applying for
the divorce from the bonds of matrimony before the decree of di-
vorce from bed and board was entered. The public policy of this
statute was followed in Haskins v. Haskins, 188 Va. 525, 50 S.E.
2d 437 (1948) where the court held that the acts which would
justify a divorce a mensa et thoro for the defendant do not have to
be reduced to a divorce decree for the statute to apply. Kirn v. Kirn
was overruled to this extent. To have held otherwise would have re-
sulted in the ridiculous situation of a spouse against whom a di-
vorce a mensa et thoro had been granted being in a more advan-
tageous position than one against whom no decree had been granted.
The origin and history of recrimination are very adequately
discussed by E. Riggs McConnell, Divorce-Recrimination-The
English Doctrine of Judicial Discretion.3 Before the Matrimonial
Causes Act4 of 1857 in England, all divorces were in the jurisdiction
of the Ecclesiastical Courts. These courts would not grant an abso-
lute divorce because of the belief that marriage is an Act of God and
indissoluble; they also applied the doctrine of recrimination to the
limited decrees that they did grant, although they seemed to be
dissatisfied with the result occasionally. The Act of 1857 gave ex-
clusive jurisdiction of divorce suits to the secular courts; it gave
them power to grant an absolute divorce; and also allowed the
court discretionary power to grant a decree where the petitioning
spouse was guilty of recriminating offenses which were conduced by
1. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, 2nd Ed.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-117 (1950).
3. 19 VA. LAW Rnv. 400 (1933).
4. 20 & 21 Vict. Ch. 85 § 31.
the behavior of the defendant. This discretionary power was specifi-
cally denied in this state in Kirn v. Kirn. Our court has, however,
admitted that a wife could abandon her husband if through no fault
of her own, and for her safety and happiness, and if it was con-
sistent with social order and public policy; and she could receive
separate maintenance notwithstanding such abandonment.'
Most courts have based the doctrine of recrimination on the
"clean hands" principle of equity.6 A divorce is acquired by suit
in equity, and he who seeks equity must do equity. Some courts
base the doctrine on a "breach of dependent covenants. ' 7
Some states have relaxed the rule to the extent that they con-
sider the comparative rectitude of the parties.8 For example, a
Texas court said, "If the recrimination on the part of the injured
spouse is insignificant compared with the great provocation on the
part of the other, the divorce may be granted." 9 Other courts 10 use
their discretion, following the English theory rather than a strict
rule. Although there is a great conflict on this subject, the greater
number of states are in accord with the Virginia policy of disre-
garding comparative rectitude of the parties. Some are even stricter,
making grounds for limited divorce a bar to absolute divorce. The
trend in most states is to be more lenient in granting divorces. In
a recent New Mexico case 12 the court wisely granted a decree to
the husband on the grounds of incompatibility, holding the husband's
alleged adultery after separation, and that a state of incompatibility
still existed were immaterial. All states are not so liberal; under
similar circumstances a South Carolina 13 decision was to the effect
that, recrimination being a defense, such facts were material re-
gardless of their order in time. Such divergence between the differ-
ent states would seemingly warrant a campaign for uniformity.
5. Haynor v. Haynor, 112 Va. 123, 70 S.E. 531 (1911).
6. Hatfield v. Hatfield, 113 W. Va. 135, 167 S.Y 89 (1932).
7. Comfort v. Comfort, 112 P.2d 259 (1941).
8. Longinotti v. Longinotti, 169 Ark. 1001 277 S.W. 41 (1925); Dearth
v. Dearth, 141 Pa.S. 344, 15 A.2d 37 (1940); Pavletich v. Pavletich,
50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946); Mart v. Mart, 191 S.W.2d 512
1945); Staples v. Staples, 136 S.W. 120 (1911).
9. Jones v. Jones, 60 Tex. 451 (1883).
10. Lasser v. Iasser, 134 Kan. 436, 7 P.2d 120 (1934); Panther v. Panther,
47 Okla. 131, 295 P. 219 (1931); Lyon v. Lyon, 39 Okla. 111, 134 P.
650 (1913).
11. Rankin v. Rankin, 121 A. 778 (1923).
12. Pavletich v. Paveltich, supra.
13. Jeffords v. Jeffords, 58 S.E.2d 731 (1950).
Objectively appraised, today's divorce situation is incongruous
with the principal basis for the doctrine of recrimination that a
divorce suit is for the benefit of an innocent party. The petitioning
party must come into court with clean hands. For example: H and
W are married and domiciled in State A which applies the doctrine
of recrimination strictly. H deserts W, grounds for divorce in
State A. Several years after W meets X who wishes to marry her,
and they have an affair. Now both H and W would be entitled to a
divorce were it not for recrimination. They can attempt, by col-
lusion to get a divorce illegally 14 in State A, concealing the re-
criminating acts of whichever party is nominally the defendant; or,
they can go to State B which allows divorce under the New Mexico
rule of comparative rectitude. Such a decree would be open to attack
in every state in the Union as to domicile in State B. 1" What is
State A gaining by such a policy? It is forcing its citizens to use
illegal methods to attain a socially beneficial result. Does the state
believe that the difficulty of obtaining a divorce will deter the
parties? In Haynor v. Haynor the court quoted Sir William Scott
in Evans v. Evans, 1 Hogg C.R. 35: "When people understand
they must live together, except for a few reasons known to the law,
they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they
know they cannot shake off. They become good husbands and good
wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching duties which
Jt imposes."
Must people live together these days when women are able to
earn their way as well as men? Is refusal of a divorce not more like
a yoke which prevents happiness in another marriage? Nothing is
harder to do than what one must do.
Another line of reasoning is quoted in Kirn v. Kirn from BISH-
OP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION §§ 370,
365: "A reason conclusive is, that where the facts tendered to
the court show a ground for divorce in favor of each of the two par-
ties and the law makes the consequences of the divorce different ac-
cording as it is given to the one party or the other, the court cannot
choose between them, extending the law's justice to the one and
withholding it from the other; it cannot render a sentence in favor
of both, because such sentence would contain a nullifying contra-
14. Grim v. Grim, 126 Va. 245, (1919); Walker v. Walker, 120 Va. 410(1917).
15. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
diction, giving and taking away the same thing at the same time. So
that the statute, authorizing the divorce and fixing the consequences,
and omittingto prefer the one offense or party over the other, by
necessary construction forbids divorce either to both, or to one to
the exclusion of the other's rights." The catchword is "conse-
quences." Why must the consequences depend on who wins the
divorce? Why must in fact one party win? Divorce is and should be
by nature different from a contract action. The courts are called on
to give relief to both parties and refuse because they cannot pick one
party over the other. The highest court of the State of Washington
in Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 546, 74 P.2d 189 (1937),16 where
both parties were found guilty of cruelty under the divorce statute
and it was impossible for the parties to live together again, held that
both parties were entitled to a divorce. Who has won this divorce?
What has become of the problem of the consequences? Property
settlements, alimony, and custody of any children can be settled in
the court's discretion according to the needs of the parties, the
ability to pay, and the equities of each individual case.
Such matters should not be argued on legal principles in the
narrow sense, on the same plane, for example, as property law. We
are dealing with different commodities. It is not herein intended to
advocate the granting of divorces where no grounds exist which
would entitle either party to a decree, but to repudiate the doctrine
of recrimination as a defense to a divorce suit; to object to the idea
that one party must necessarily win the case, and therefore come
into court with clean hands. Since recrimination is an established
doctrine in this state an appeal is therefore made to the legislature
for more realistic divorce laws which will satisfy the needs and
desires of the people. Other states have discovered that it is more
important to cure a social defect than to maintain antiquated legal
principles. Virginia, it is hoped, will not linger behind forever.
EDWIN HAMMOND PIERCE, JR.
16. Accord, Schirmer v. Schirmer, 83 Wash. 676, 145 P. 981 (1915).
